Abstract:
Academia must have a place in the decision making process. This process must include a way in which to convey its message to the widest varieties of audiences, and be able to interest individuals who otherwise would not be interested. This message whether through a fictional character or through another high profile character, should not come from agency officials. That message is: dead, diseased, dying trees, and overgrown forest lands should be managed for forest appeal, health, and to pre-mitigate extreme fire behavior, by eliminating potential fire fuels. That to eliminate costs of managing forests, and disposing of, or moving timber fuels, acceptable markets can be created to gather interest for future commerce and markets that will make the system of forest management self-supportive. But that in order to better identify what approach to take at an individualized and local variance, a more in depth system of regime classification is needed.
--“As the agency noted in February 1999, it has not yet mapped these interface areas with the precision needed to identify and design individual high-priority fuel reduction projects.”—General Accounting Office.
Citing the Federal Advisory Act in order to shut the academic out of the process, Federal agencies refuse to recognize academia as credible members of understanding in settings when debate over policy and review have taken place (Wakimoto 1989; Franklin & Agee 2003). This became apparent as early as the 1988 Yellowstone Fire After Action Review. When a distinguished Professor of the Fire and Forestry Department at the University of Montana was advise by senior federal authorities that he was allowed to ride along in the AAR helicopter flyover of the park. But because he didn't have the proper U.S. "G" classification (G-12 . . . G-6. . . G-4, G-3, G-2, with G-1 having the highest authority. . . ) his opinions in the actual deliberations to determine what should be done in the future to prevent these sorts of disasters wouldn't be heard. This effect has inhibited public review, and is why the public believes its role in the interagency setting is only that of observation (Shindler & Neburka 1997). (As a side note: I have a G-4, IC. Type 4 status. )
While the public observes the smoke covering the Western United States, and breathes the greenhouse gasses, it doesn't have an opinion with the federal agencies on how to prevent this from happening in the future, at least not according the Federal Advisory Act.
–(5 U.S.C. Appendix 2)
•§ 15, In general--An agency may not use any advice or recommendation provided by the National Academy of Sciences or National Academy of Public Administration that was developed by use of a committee created by that academy under an agreement with an agency.
When most people look at a burnt forest they feel it is unhealthy (Benson 1996). When a silviculture manager, or scientist looks at a burnt forest several aspects of a different nature may pop into their head. But to a fire manager (ICT 4 or better) it’s probably WFIP (Wildland fire use: Implementation Procedures reference guide).
On most of today’s topographies initial fire size-up comes via an aircraft’s widow, or out a lookout tower. The first response of initial attack is a list of preset journal logs. These prompts are to aid in later document recovery and incident identification. The second analysis is to begin identifying the go/no go questions. It is within this list that the initial assessment as to prospected overall damage of the fire disturbance begins (WFIP 2005).
More out of the sequence of events, than an intentional standpoint from any of the different individuals involved, the transition stages between instances in time, as parties move into and out of the process, can sometimes create controversy between factions. The problem calls for a cohesive strategy, yet blank space between agencies’ involvement, or views, fits policy for failure.
The standard method for review, finding problematic issues, developing remedies, and implementation of agency recommended strategy, do not solve the core dysfunctions (Agency Strategy 2000). As a result large wildfires continue to occur clouding the already taxed atmosphere with more greenhouse gasses. A concept that itself is misunderstood by the public.
The public is a mixed array of intellectual consumers. As unlikely as it would be to calculate that the audience is dumb. There are thousands possibly millions who are ignorant of the facts (Kovach & Rosenstiel 2007). In attempting to convey a message properly, the one in attempt must take into consideration that they are speaking to two different audiences. The one audience is those individuals who know what the topic is, and probably a lot more on the subject trying to be conveyed, than the one conveying it. The other audience is those individuals who have no idea but are curious.
Funny thing: even with people generally recognizing the information better if it was presented from a reliable source, the most influential individual within the Forest Service, still became a fictional character, “Smokey Bear” (Towman et al. 2006). He was even more known than the U.S. President (Pyne 1982).
A board derived completely of agency personnel geared mainly at fire suppression, its tactical awareness and logistics, will focus discussions into those areas. Outside the “loupe” so to speak, there are the agency personnel who deal mostly with land management, or who deal with endangerment of the spotted owl, for instance. Agencies for water right, watershed benefits and so forth, this is only to name a few. In the end there may be hundreds of individuals who have a general knowledge of what is being presented, but only a few with pinpoint scientific exactitude as to what did, or what will cause the illuminated problem.
If ever there is to be cohesion of strategy, as the General Accounting Office called for in 1999, this strategy must not only include fire agencies, but all agencies with an involvement to the forest, i.e. academic facilities. Without the conveyance of knowledge across the board, there is relatively little chance of an ideal outcome. And the implementation of a cohesive strategy is doomed to failure, if interested individuals with a pinpoint academic knowledge, and all the agencies, are not included in the decision making process.
The United States is a democracy. It isn’t Bhutan, China, or the former Soviet Union. It is a country based on the vote of public opinion. For cohesion to exist, the opinion of academia must also have a place. The opinion of land management, along with opinions from academia across the landscapes of social science, wildlife, its refuge, air quality control, and more, must also be allowed to weigh-in. Different angles of understanding will provide the topography of thought with the entire landscapes of reasoning.
In the realms of fire, an overall attitude change from the initial conception of Smokey Bear has occurred. Strategy management shifted emphasis from straightforward suppression to fire management for the benefit of all resources involved (Dombeck et al. 2004). However, in a hold-over from the initial days of Smokey Bear there is the contemporary belief that fire is bad. Across these landscapes, a waning resistance to the act of burning for resources benefit is occurring. This “easing-up” of the public on the issues of forest health and fire has been sustained through general knowledge conveyance in the distribution of brochures and pamphlets (Loomis 2001).
Though, even with the appeal of suppression efforts that are displayed across the periphery, in a multiple of ways through media avenues, the public is still at odds with itself to recognize: the practices of purposeful burning, or not aggressively attacking a fire, these strategies are not new strategies, nor are they necessarily bad (Burke 2004). If as an entire body, those wishing to know more about the practice, were afforded a chance to understand its rational, then the practice of burning would be accepted (Yaffee & Wondolleck 1997; Shindler & Neburka 1997). Since it is impossible for scientific revelation to speak to the lay audience (Jamieson 1994), how to present this information on the public has been in controversy for quite some time (Carpenter et al. 1986; Manfredo et al 1990; McCool and Stankley 1986).
Adult learners are more likely to grasp the presentation of knowledge that is portrayed with a current problem as its central issue (Wlodkowski 1999). Included in this aspect, are the credentials of agency personal or the person conveying said information (Knowles et al. 1998). Past experience with the Forest Service, or the Bureau of Land Management, though it aids those in these groups to recognize the angle of others therein, these credentials are not generally precepts to sway public opinion into supporting newly devised strategy. Or to gather public support for a continuation of strategy that to date has been covertly implicated and has not provided effective results. Some people will just never trust agencies involved in forestry maintenance and ecological health, (Schindler & Toman 2003). That is why delivery of the message that targets the optimal management of forestry fire-fuel build-up is of the utmost importance, and should not come from agency personnel (Shindler et al. 2002).
Two attempts to sway the public opinion were the broad concept, or a Colorado initiative to reach the public through an insert in the newspaper, and the concept of interactive learning, which consisted of guided tours in Oregon. Of these two, the indirect approach taken in Colorado was found efficient at conveying the information (Rogers 2003), but appeared insufficient at gaining the public’s trust; which, was found to be present in those who were interactively involved in guided tours, as was the case in Oregon (Erwin 2001; Rogers 2003).
In Arizona, officials just started a program without trying to gain much public support. The resulting White Mountain Stewardship fuels reduction program is littered with pragmatic understandings. But the effects do appear to provide a visual example that a Stewardship program helped direct fire away from settlements, and structures (Bostwick et al. 2011).
Interagency fire, and in a round-about way even land management personnel have received information through reviews, as the one Bostwick (et al. 2011) composed as an after action assessment of the Wallow Fire--a blaze that had burned 522,900 acres in Arizona and New Mexico during the summer of 2011 (Gabbert). These reviews were, as most reviews are, directed more at agency managers and policy writers, and less at public opinion. As discussed above, this in itself may be another blank-spot in the process?
Building a system of trust, it seems has been the best means to identify a situation, and receive the public’s support for recommended actions. This is a particularly pragmatic understanding because there are so many levels of trust (Kramer 1999). Since it has been found that very few individuals fully trust the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (Shindler et al. 2002), and the mythical image of a bear has become the agencies’ most trusted individual, how will the public decide to trust the current message? In almost all documentation describing one aspect of the forest as correlated with fire, a statement that too much dead, dying, or diseased fuel is in the forests, is included. An information set that rang like an echo in reports from Wakimoto in ’89 to Agee in 1993, to the reports of a Cohesive Strategy Oversight Committee in 2011, almost all of the recent documents state the long-term effects from the last century’s aggressive nature to suppress forest fire succeeded only in allowing brush and small trees to flourish. It allowed trees to encroach on grasslands (Arno & Gruell 1986), allowed trees to grow where fire normally would have weeded them out (Scott 1998). These areas are now prepped to accommodate uncharacteristically intense fire through their diminished ecosystem health and lowered resilience to bug infestation.
In the wake of the Arizona’s Wallow fire, the implication by Bostwick (et al. 2011) that the White Mountain Stewardship program saved hundreds of houses may be hard to deny. In retrospect the 2005 Gregory Fire, that occurred in the Boise National Forest, overlooking Idaho City on a south aspect, also shows the direct result of forestry Stewardship saving public housing located in the Wildland/Urban Interface.
At the time of ignition the Gregory burned in a unit with management prescriptions, and fuel treatment programs that had been underway, at that point, for several years (Dynamac 2003; Tenneson 2006). The unit, according to township and range, had been treated earlier that spring. Yet the slash piles were still on the ground and awaited fall, or the next spring’s wet months when appropriate personnel would come in and burn them. Since the fuels were still on the ground, they presented areas where once ignited they would create a more intense fire environment and possibly allow the flames to climb into the over-story. It is a matter of physics. And with hundreds of logs scattered across the ground, and most of the fine fuels stacked into igloo shaped piles, all that was needed was a lightning storm, and the modified condition class was ready to create hazardous fire potentials. That as a matter of speaking, is what happened.
The fire, once ignited spread from the ignition source through the browning igloo piles, where it gained momentum and climbed up into the treetops. It over-crowned and went directly down the hillside into Idaho City (Long 2006). In the areas that had been treated in previous years, with the subsequent fine fuels already having been burned, a low intensity surface fire affected a mere stand altering situation. Fire personnel, as in the latter case of the Wallow Fire, were able to get a handle on the blaze in these areas. These areas, however lined the corridor between Idaho City homes and the pretreated fuel piles, and sort of directed the fire down through a channel. Where it amassed a central intensity that denatured everything and killed almost all the biomass, the result was a stand replacing situation.
By dark on the first day of ignition, the Gregory had raged down first through the area where the fine fuels were in piles, then into an area that had been treated years earlier, and was threatening structures.
Low intensity fires, usually in low altitudes through ponderosa stands do not typically create stand replacement effects (Arno 1993). In the case of the upper altitude fir dominated fire fuels, because a fir tree’s structure aids surface fire with an avenue to climb into the canopy, a fire in these fuels will usually over-crown (Schoennagle et al. 2004). Treatments aimed toward removing surface, ladder fuels, and tree-to-tree space density, are proposed to create a more environmentally friendly habitat, and decrease the chance of stand replacing fire occurrences (Franklin & Agee 2003).
In both the case of the Gregory and the Wallow, where the fine or dead surface, and ladder fuels had been removed this hypothesis was tested to success. In the case of the Gregory alone, where a section of the unit was in mid-treatment, the result was stand replacement. Where these fuels had already been removed, the biomass was altered but a great percentage of the larger more valuable trees were left alive. This isn’t saying that all the treatment areas in the White Mountain Stewardship were completed at the time the Wallow fire threatened the communities of Alpine, Greer, and Eagar, Arizona. One observation of the completed treatment units, when the fire entered these units, it dropped from the canopy to the surface. Thus with a less intense fire, radiation was not as severe and allowed fire personnel to tactically approach and distinguish burning embers (Bostwick et all 2011).
In the 1988 Yellowstone fire, since it had been deemed before-hand that the park should be kept as close to the natural look it would take without the structures in the Wildland Urban Interface, no defensible space was allowed for around structures found near Old Faithful. When the wildfire was in full blaze, wildland fire personnel were pulled from other important posts in an attempt to scramble and fortify these areas (Wakimoto 1989), areas that should have been treated prior to ignition.
In ponderosa pine it is especially beneficial to reduce the level of mid-canopy fuels, to reduce the possible hazards involving fire danger (Scott). In the 1989 study conducted in a unit of Lolo National Forest just northwest of Missoula, it analyzed the aspects of fuel removal. Like White Mountain, and Idaho City, this stand treatment also attempted to essentially pay for itself.
White Mountain had created a pellet industry (Forestry Notes 2011), through a government initiative--this all before the Wallow Fire devoured 522,900 acres (Gabbert 2011). Idaho City, located an odd 37 miles northeast from Boise, for which the Boise National Forest gets its name, had as well initiated an attempt to recover revenue used to prepare the surrounding ponderosa. Instead of a large commercial logging operation that would bring the more merchantable boles out of the forest, another means was used. Some mid-sized boles in the more overgrown areas were winched to access points, piled, and sold at auction to the highest bidder for fence posts and rails or winter fuel storage for a residential wood burner. These boles were selectively hand-picked due to defects, tree diseases, and other unhealthy characteristics. This project had been in progress for a number of years when the Gregory Fire devoured 1132 acres on the Boise National (Zimmerlee 2006).
The six mile project just northwest of Missoula (Scott 1998) had three different disturbance levels as its overall scheme:
Minimum impact,
To devise a process of revenue production,
Forest restoration.
The control areas were sectioned into four six acre treatment areas. In the fall of 1993, the usable boles in unit one were hand felled, winched out of the forest, and used as firewood. Piling and burning of excess and slash was also conducted that fall.
Unit two was harvested as a commercial logging operation, and the canopy was essentially opened by the felling of large trees. This treatment also included the felling of a select number of the under-canopy trees. The intent of the economy at the time: to offset costs of the other thinning and treatment operations by selling the larger boles. Landing slash was burned. No further disturbances were inflicted.
Unit three had already been intentionally broadcast burned September 1993. After the merchantable timber had been removed according to prescriptions of unit two, the landing slash was backhauled by a rubbertire skidder.
Unit four was kept in a natural stasis, and no disturbance was inflicted.
A fifth unit consisting of ponderosa and fir that had been severely burnt by a naturally occurring fire in 1995 was added. It is unsure whether this fire slammed into the treatment units and was diverted into the more readily available fuels, in untreated areas or the area's that were in mid treatment or not, as no indications for or against the such are referenced in Scott’s findings. This unit was added to the study as a control aspect that represented the area’s natural fire regime. Some trees were slavaged post-burn. Initial results of the six mile study (Scott 1998) were focused at the economic feasibility of a project at this scale, which disturbance levels produced the best appeal visually, and the new potential of surface fire, and that of crown fire behavior.
Of the five units manipulated with different disturbance levels, the modified conditions in unit one generated $156.00 worth of revenue per acre. The area in unit two generated $832.00 per acre. And unit three generated $222.00 per acre. These statistics were concluded using the going price of timber salvage, as correlated to the study year. No revenues were attained from the other two units, as they were not harvested as a part of this study.
The most visually appealing unit ended up becoming unit one, where elaborate thinning and fuel reductions procedures were implicated.
The least favorite unit, visually, was the stasis condition in unit five, the unit that had burnt naturally. These results were found in a parallel study that presented photographs of the units to a variety of individuals (Benson 1996).
At its conclusion, Scott’s (1998) study predicted that for the treatment units to maintain a retardant against sever fire behavior, unit one would need to be retreated between 2008 and 2018, unit two between 2018 and 2028, and unit three between 2013 and 2018.
Given twelve years of evolution from the publication of Scott’s findings in ’98, and those of Bostwick, (et al 2011) as concerned with the White Mountain Stewardship, the experiment unit at six mile may provide a long range parallel condition for comparison purposes.
With the understanding of the wild, as has evolved in recent years, it’s not about trying to prevent forest fires. It’s about trying to stop them from burning so intense that a stand replacement effect occurs. It seems that for cohesion to function fire strategy management, policy management, land management, and distinguished members of academia should focus discussions on how to control fire. In a sense not so unlike how the household woodburner’s temperature is controlled by the amount of wood available in the fire chamber.
Fire ecology is a part of the Earth’s natural cycle (Arno 1993; Agee 1993), and is an integral part of the ecosystem (Bowman, et al. 2000). Scientists linking simulation activities to understanding the real life analysis of forest fire, have uncovered certain ‘switches’ (Murphy 2011) that must be flipped before fire activity can exist. Fire is within its limits. Usually, a limited supply of fuel (burnable material) inhibits burnable area, or wet climates inhibit ignitions, and/or spread. The rate of fire spread after ignition also has a serious correlation to the structure and composition of a stand, or what type of species is the predominant biomass in the area (Schoennagle et al. 2004). This is also closely related to how intense a fire actually burns.
If a fire burns every available amount of biomass, it makes sense that it would logically take longer for that region’s vegetation to return to a state when ‘switches’ will be flipped, and the possibility of it being able to sustain fire again exists (Murphy 2011). In some species of tree this could take several decades, in others it could take several more. The diversity between compositions creates a variety of different variables first in the growth rate, and physical characteristic, then in mortality rate and decomposition. In the case of rapid decomposition, as in a wildfire, physical placement or stand density and the ratio of live fuel as compared to the dead fuel judge weather a fire will remain on the surface, or climb into the crown. When a crown fire occurs, it is usually a direct indicator that the forest is experiencing a stand replacing fire (Schoennagle et al. 2004).
Hardy (et al. 1998) broke the natural aspect of fire regimes down into six classes, zero-six, with zero being listed as an area that historically never experienced fire. Barett (et al. 2005) kept most of this theory intact, yet disregarded Hardy’s (et al. 1998) notion that an area forested with terrestrial biomass was never historically prone to fire, and Hardy’s 2001 (et al) addition of a seventh and eighth fire regime--barren land, and water bodies. However, Franklin and Agee (2003) believe that Barrett’s theory must accommodate more classes to satisfy overall diversity of the land.
Barrett’s within agency regimes comprise:
1) 0-35 year low or mixed intensity, stand altering regimes,
2) 0-35 year high severity, stand replacing regimes,
3) 35-200+ year low or mixed severity, stand altering,
4) 35-200+ year high intensity, stand replacing,
5) 200+ year high intensity, stand replacing.
According to these models there are only two types of forest fire. One, when an ignition lights the hillside ablaze it burns with low intensity and doesn’t kill all of the vegetation, such as typically occurs in the ponderosa (McKelvey & Busse 1996; Rollins 2000), or as Franklin and Agee put it (2003) in the lower elevation south aspect forests. The other type of fire is the type that burns so intense essentially nothing remains alive (Schoennagle et al. 2004). Franklin and Agee (2003) have this correlated to higher altitudes, and northern aspects, or fir forests.
Morgan (et al. 1999) on the other hand, has compared four different systems of thought. Then she used a different language to combine the fire regimes. These comparisons were done on a specific site analyses of the Columbia River Basin. The results are:
0-25 years
25-50 years
300+ years,
These three different regimes, unlike the contemporary five USFS fire regimes, produce three different outcomes:
Non-lethal to the biomasses,
mixed, killing some and not others,
stand replacing.
Typically the difference in stand composition really determines the overall effect of condition class, as Schoennagle (et al. 2004) has identified. In a reclassification of Schmidt’s (et al. 2002) findings, a study that concluded there are eight potential natural vegetation groups. Findings that again describe more regimes as Franklin & Agee (2003) have implicated, Schoennagle and company (et al. 2004) condensed Schmidt’s theory to three, using site specific analyses in the Western United States.
Ponderosa
Douglas-fir
Spruce-fir, sub-alpine, lodge-pole, etc . . .
Stephen Arno (1991) as well has the regimes broken down into three groups referencing (Kigore 1987):
Frequent surface fires, less than a 25 year return interval,
Infrequent surface fires, 25-100 year return interval,
Infrequent stand replacing fires, more than a 50 year return interval
James Agee, in his 1993 book: Fire ecology of Pacific Northwest Forests, has used an older system that appears more general, and may function as an overarching principle to describe all regimes (citing Rowe 1983), no matter diversity, or location. The system correlates the area to the biomass type, and the biomass type to its adaptability with fire.
Invaders, species that have invaded that specific area,
Evaders, a species adapted to resist a number of elements, fire, etc. . .
Avoiders, shade-tolerant, no adaptation to fire,
Resisters, thick bark, adapted to fire,
Endurers, can re-sprout from root mass, regenerate quickly, etc . . .
As a matter of oversimplification (contemporary USFS regimes are implicated for further modeling purposes) fir and lodge-pole dominated stands belong in the 35-200+ range. When these stands burn the typical resulting effect is a crown that kills all or a predominate portion of the biomass (Shoennagle et al. 2004). A stand replacement disturbance class conditioned by the atypical arrangement of tree structure, high quantities of ladder fuel, and the condensation of tree structures as correlated with one another.
The ponderosa, on the other hand, is a tall species, thick barked and has relatively few lower branches. The structure of the tree itself lends a defensible space against the element of fire (Agee 1993). In middle, and lower elevation stands dominated by the presence of ponderosa, the return interval is 0-35 years. In other words historically the land has experienced a fire situation every thirty five years since this specific forest climax evolved on this planet. This is the sort of stand that typically encounters the highest fire frequency due to its drying effect in late summer (McKelvey & Busse 1996; Rollins 2000). An effect controlled by the weather and climate patters on the region (Hohnson & Wowchuck 1993; Swetnam & Betancourt 1998).
These last two classifications comparing higher altitude fir, and middle to lower altitude ponderosa pine tend to work for the normal scenario of forest ecology, or a pre-settlement analyses (More et al. 1999; Franklin & Agee 2003). Add a century worth of suppression, and these two classes change dramatically (Arno 1993).
Smaller pines in the larger ponderosa lend the ignition source a hand in connecting the forest floor with the forest canopy (Schoennagle et al. 2004). Now instead of only radiant heat to worry about, which is the case in most pre-settlement forests of this class, during a fire the ponderosa canopies are exposed to convective heat, where the flames actually lick the upper branches. It’s almost inevitable that when this happens on a good dry hot August day, in many of the Northern United States, and Canadian latitudes, the chance of a crown fire is almost immanent. After the entire stand torches, in its wake the crown usually leaves little if any biomasses alive, again a defining point of a stand replacement fire, for all intent and purpose.
Analyzing the physical facts, personal conclusions again lead to the hypothesis that there are only two types of fire: stand replacing, and stand altering. Nevertheless, deduction states a single incident can present stand replacing behavior in some areas, and stand altering in others. As Morgan (et al.1999) has pointed out, regardless of whether it occurs in ponderosa or in fir.
Reanalyzing common deduction: both stand altering fires, and those that burn so intense that everything is killed, can burn in at least three different classes of forest conditions, as deduced in the agency (USFS) Fire Regime Condition Class, according to altered states. Since the century worth of suppression has altered the natural FRCC (Arno 1993), it can almost be expected that at least three variables exist for fire effects involved in stands of only fir, and in stands predominately forested by ponderosa. Unless, that is, something is done to remove the radical agent in ponderosa in order to bring it back into its natural condition. This could be done by prescribed burning, or by removing the dead, diseased, or dying, and the younger smaller pines, and those touching limb-to-limb in the canopy, or by a combination.
Hence, in a stand where the predominant biomass is just one species the three phase FRCC works to describe possible fire characteristics if ignited--low intensity, moderate intensity, and high intensity. This as correlated to the possible effect after ignition to just one stand of ponderosa with the added variable of a century’s worth of suppression and a changing climate. In the pre-settlement (Moore et al. 1999; Franklin & Agee 2003) natural aspect of ponderosa however, it is more likely that on a south aspect only two regimes would be necessary. What happens in the northern aspect stands of trees where the dominate structures, not dominant species, but stands that are over a certain percentile composed of say white-bark pine? This question raises the eyebrow, and is posed in an attempt to display what Franklin and Agee (2003) have stated: there needs be more regimes. Or, there needs be another means to describe regimes at a site-to-site variance.
Necessity and common sense would explain that a white-bark pine dominated forest would not burn as a ponderosa forest, nor as a fir forest. Hence, though closely related to one of the five federal regimes (Barnett, et al. 2010) none of the five would serve to exactly classify the stand. Therefore, in theory, at least one more regime would have a place among, or operate as a factor of, the other five.
Understanding that there are variables between different sites, another class or subclass of regime could be defined by using the topography of range land that is nearly devoid of tree structures, but accommodates a wealth of grasses. Just to be a bit sarcastic, the desert, and Iceland could serve as two more regimes. To that point, what type of desert, sage and chaparell? The desert as in sand: seriously! Iceland as in volcano’s: Hawaii as another prime example. As far apart as these locations are, within a topography of forest, when the topography and Climax Species of a forest change from place to place the differences, to the trained eye, sometimes can be as evident. Franklin and Agee (2003) have pointed at the forests in Western Washington and Northwestern Oregon as more understandable reference points that have varying stratification and are not fully represented by the current Federal fire regime.
As Franklin and Agee stated there are more fire regimes (2003). They all have factors connecting them together, but they are not all classified neatly in only five different stratifications. It must then be deduced in the form of a factor tree. A stand is derived mainly of this type of tree (hypothetical), the derivatives of said stand would determine what factors would be involved, say in the range of pre-treatment, fire behavior, actual go/no go decisions, suppression strategies, and even post burn operations. Factors that rely heavily on the original dominant structures in the stand, or what biomass dominates the mosaic, as Schmidt (et al. 2002), Franklin & Agee (2003), and Schoennagle (et al. 2004) have identified.
Forming an empirical base of datum then for the cheatgrass hillsides of south-central Idaho to the hardwoods in the Appalachia, agency personnel must also take in consideration that there is a whole lot of topography in between.
That isn’t even taking into consideration the probabilities of regrowth, which are astronomical. White-fir forests typically reproduce faster than ponderosa (Franklin & Agee 2003), and therefore present a different variable in the regime. It may have worked to speculate for Wall Street, Freddie Mac, and Fanny Mae, but science has no room for speculation.
Understanding the basic composition of the predominant species growing in a given topography, and what treatments have been implicated on that species, gives the triers of fact a better sense of the variables, and frees the resource of thought to better distribute authority in dealing with contingent disturbances.
That is why academia should also have a place within the agency decision and policy making process. Not interagency academia, but public academia--a system of thought that in itself looks at the landscape from a different angle.
At present, policy has tried to explain everything from the Florida Panhandle, to the Pacific Northwest using one codex of understanding and has generalized the heterogeneity of regimes. As a result the agencies can only gain a general sense of what is included in these topographies, and will lack pinpoint academic knowledge. Knowledge that could be useful to cover certain aspects of forest ecology, not to mention fire suppression strategy, beyond the initial go/no go analyses when ignition detections occur.
As the farmer from Oklahoma would look at his land, and harvest his crops from different than a farmer in Nebraska, a firefighter’s strategy in Florida would differ from that in the northwest. In fact, the industry of forest management is not so unlike the agricultural industry--corn for Nebraska, wheat for Oklahoma, melons and oranges for California and Florida--whereas in the Rocky’s there’s ponderosa pine and fir (Moore et al. 1999), in Florida loblolly pine and white-cedar (Clewell 1985), hardwoods in the Appalachia (Moore et al. 1966). This isn’t even taking the heterogeneity, or diversity, between the understory vegetation of these different regions into account.
In between and around Nebraska, Oklahoma, California, and Florida some individuals may distribute the use of land to accommodate a variety of edible vegetation. At the end of the summer, and beginning of fall, farmers harvest these crops in a variety of ways. The corn farmer of Nebraska uses the corn-husker. The wheat farmer of Oklahoma uses the combine. The melon and fruit plantations hire hand labor to pick the fruits and vegetables.
In a presentation given to students at the University of Montana, “We can’t eat trees” said, professor of forestry, Dr. Ron Wakimoto. We have, however, come to use them in a variety of ways.
As the growth and reproduction rates of agricultural lands differ from crop to crop, and region to region, and the ways in which these crops are harvested differs, so too does the reproduction of forest stands and the means to reduce their potential burning index differ from sight-to-sight.
The mixture carried in heat currents--the smoke plume of a forest fire--are particulate emissions that aren’t much different in chemical composition from those spewing out of a coal fired smoke stack at an electric mill. The only major difference is mankind can harness the energy in an electric mill. To date however, no one has been able to trap the power release of a wildfire and its raging potential just rises heating the already taxed atmosphere.
As Phase I of the 2011 Cohesive Strategy states: applicability must be intended to apply to all (individuals) regions. Yet, a strategy for fire and even fuels treatment in an Arizona fuel and topography would not be exactly applicable in a Pacific Northwest fuel-scape. It would needs to be adjusted to compensate for noticeable variance. This means a strategy needs to be developed to meet local, regional, and national needs (Cohesive 2011).
Federal agencies as well as state and private land owners, could follow this system, a sort of order of operations, for overall diversity between species, the applicable burning indexes, rates of spread, etc…. And would in theory work on all lands between Seattle, San Francisco, and New York City, from a , because codes/policies designed for a Maine topography would then not be used in a California climax or even seral species.
Therefore, for policies to work away from the metaphysical landscapes of pen and paper, a need that fire behavior regions be identified is clear. And within said regions an overall policy for “go/no go” actions then must be formed. In other words, training to implicate policy must be diversified at the larger scale, then funneled into a specific area that all officials, academics, and laborers know the overarching principles on a national level, and are also firmly set on the ground with strategic implications at local variance.
This would prove to implicate a teaching module that ultimately will qualify some members to be more efficient at handling disturbances in certain areas, while others are less qualified.
The Cohesive Strategy Phase I of 2011 defines risk management by the evaluation of exposure to the extremities, versus the overall gain of said exposure. For overall practicum, flame for resource benefit joins the wildland with the urban in a comprehensive endowment that states: fire is ecologically beneficial to the land (Kilgore 1984; Arno 1993; Agee 1993). Ecologically, as a statement that forest health sometimes needs its litter floor swept clean in order to continue on, without falling susceptible to the natural hazards overabundance of fuels provide. These hazards of course are not limited to fire alone: bug species infestation and mold or fungus to name a few. Both disturbances currently pose serious threats to the genus of white-bark pine, (Arno 1986; Murry et al. 2000).
This problem is not new, nor has it gone unrecognized. The Strategy for Cohesion (2011) lists that “Rigorous wildfire prevention programs are supported across all jurisdictions.” Whether intended or unintended a cohesion and implication for fire management of these aspects—prevention of large fires by fuel reduction would aid in succession of tree species, wildlife and landscape succession, along with the ecological interactions of mankind—a non-shift in priorities that may well serve to meet different agency’s land management goals as well.
At present Phase I of the Strategy just mapped a landscape for overall conjunction of policies, and tactical implication while selecting regions for individualized risk assessment. Phase II needs and maybe a better correlative analysis between the Pacific Northwest and Oklahoma to show diversity in fuel-scapes. Overarching a principle that shows a better starting point that more compartmentalized policy is needed on a smaller sub-regional basis. Accordingly, the 2011 policy implicates that Phase II is purported to focus at measurement of risk, in order to address risks more at multiple scales but it appears this Phase hasn't delivered. As evident by the smoke covering the entire Western United States.
In conclusion, for the circle of fire to be complete it needs to start at the top, arch down and back up, connecting the three major chords. A mathematical analysis that brings fire out of its triangles with fixed points, and allows for more of a circular pattern that better enables the movement of information; with everything all encompassed inside said “Ring of Fire.”
As stated above, as stated in the Strategy’s (2011) conclusion, this is not an endpoint, it’s a beginning. As fire and the circle of life continue to revolve and evolve the evolution of thought must likewise continue to evolve and revolve. In this it is a necessity the public understand why there needs be an end to forest fuel buildup.
Stephen Arno and James Brown suggested (1989) that there be three zones of variance to cure the problem.
Zone 1: Wilderness areas--prescribe burn to replicate natural return intervals.
Zone 2: National Forests/private ownership forests--harvest and manage.
Zone 3: Wildland Urban Interface--harvest and steward.
As outlined in this academic philosophy removal of fuels is the key to stopping fire. In Phase II of the Strategy (2011), the collaborative process that will allow the evolution of thought to grasp the overall scheme must address the specific diametric composition of each part of the process. It must be readily available to convey the message, and make the general, disinterested, or interested individual cognizant of the overall implications.
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